Under which circumstances do politicians diferentiate among immigrants? When they do, why do they in some countries focus on Muslim immigrants rather than national or other groups? We use claims-making analysis to capture how immigrant groups are diferentiated in seven Western European countries. As explanations for variation in claims-making about Muslim immigrants (1995-2009) we consider socio-structural and citizenship-regime diferences across countries, the parliamentary presence of anti-immigrant parties, the 9/11 WTC atack and the direct political context in which claims-making occurs. We ind that Muslim-related claims-making is associated with the parliamentary presence of anti-immigrant parties and the policy topic under discussion. By contrast, the evidence for policy-oriented and socio-structural explanations is inconclusive. There is a need for further theory development on the efects of the political debate (topics, arguments, actors) on (migrant-)group diferentiation in particular and politicization in general.
Introduction
A recurring theme in comparative politics is the translation of social differences into political oppositions and cleavages. Social divisions are sometimes seen as forming the base of political groups within countries and explain differences between party systems. Relevant divisions may be between capital and labour, between religious and non-religious sections in society, or between 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2012) . They are usually presented as historically persistent, for example in the party system (Mair 1997) . The capacity of political systems for reflecting social differences, however, is limited (van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Green-Pedersen 2010) : Of the many social differences and conflicts that could be politicized, politicians can attend to only one or two at a time. Because they want a clear profile, public and media attention does not allow them to do otherwise. Consequently, certain "issues are organized into politics, while others are organized out" (Schattschneider 1960, 69) . Both the activities of politicians -be these public claims, organizing potential constituents, or constructing differences between social groupsand the social-structural composition of society contribute to shaping political differences. We do not know which of these two general factors is more important.
We are interested in the circumstances under which certain sections of society (and not others) become politically meaningful categories: as objects of policy, as a source of political contestation, or as a base for political mobilization. Among social categories, those associated with immigration have become central for party-political conflict. Do politicians differentiate among immigrants groups? If they do, do they usually divide immigrant groups by country of origin, on the basis of their administrative status, or by religion? Here we focus on the differentiation of Muslim-migrants from other immigrants-groups. We do so because there is more intense politicisation associated with this (religious) category compared to 'administrative' distinctions made among immigrants. The increase in politicisation is also reflected in a growing academic literature on the subject (Fetzer 2005; Zainiddinov 2012 ; e.g. Cinalli and Giugni 2013; Dancygier 2013; Strabac, Aalberg, and Valenta 2014; Helbling 2014a) . The relative intensity of the debate should make it more likely to find evidence for any of the theoretically plausible causes of a focus on Muslim immigrants as objects of political claims. These political claims are used as evidence of differentiation and that Muslim immigrants are constituted as a particular group. Our research question is:
Under which circumstances do politicians differentiate Muslim immigrants -rather than national or other groups -as objects of political claims?
In this article, we relate to the discussion on the origin of political opposition and assess the relative importance of social-structural differences, political institutional structures, and (party) political strategies for the construction of socio-political categories in general, and religious categories in particular. We examine seven European countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) between 1995 and 2009. We describe the different ways in which people with a migration background are portrayed as a distinct political category: as an immigrant group from a particular country, as a group denominated by religion (usually Islam), with reference to race or ethnicity, 1 or based on their administrative status. We focus on claims about immigration and civic integration because this is where the construction of immigrant groups is most likely to occur. 2 The examination of group classifications is not a new field of study; our contribution is that we include a relatively broad range of explanatory factors and mediating factors that vary over time, across countries and between political claims. This allows us to assess the relative importance of several factors. This broader approach potentially helps us to produce better specified models, or at least suggest the appropriate level at which future research should construct theories of the politicization of immigration.
Theory: The Classification of Immigrant Groups
Our starting point is the observation that there are systematic differences in the categorization of immigrant groups (2005, 107-45; Koopmans 2007a, 701-2) . In very broad terms, relevant discursive identities and social categories can be explained by strategic choice on the part of political actors, and by opportunity structures that vary across countries and time. We present a parsimonious model that includes factors relating to political behaviour, factors that are more structural in nature, and more contingent factors such as specific events. We propose four hypotheses about the constitution of (Muslim) immigrant categories as a distinct category of political contestation -as objects of policy, but also as claims-makers. These hypotheses pertain to social-structural change, political institutions, party political strategies, and other country-and time-specific phenomena. These factors are influenced by the immediate context of the political debate.
POLITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS
Several immigration-related collective (political) identities or social categories may be expressed in the public sphere. We follow Koopmans et al. (2005; 1999) who identify four ways: administrative status categories, racial categories, religious categories, and categories drawing on country of origin or ethnic identities.
3
The first category includes undifferentiated identities, such as being an immigrant or belonging to a minority group, but also administrative status like being an asylum-seeker or foreign citizen. The second category covers racial identities such as Black or Asian, and refers to differences based on blood relations. It has an Anglo-American tradition, considered politically correct in the United Kingdom (e.g. Aspinall 2002 ), but regarded as discriminatory in large parts of continental 1 We refer to race and ethnicity jointly to capture the different use of the terms in the countries covered. By examining claims about immigration and integration we do not treat the question whether Muslim immigrants are perceived as integrated or assimilated. Neither do we examine to what extent different political actors consider Muslim immigrants to be integrated or assimilatedɑ or whether government policies in this area are effective.
Europe. The third category highlights the religious affiliation of immigrants. Because of our focus on claims about immigration and integration, we reduce this category to Muslims in the empirical analysis. In the fourth category, ties with the country of origin are the basis for political mobilization. In sociological terms, we refer to 'categories' rather than 'groups' (Jenkins 1997 ), although we acknowledge that the two may be reinforcing to some extent.
The first hypothesis deals with country differences in citizenship traditions. All social categories and identities are regarded as part of broader discursive, political, historical and institutional structures which facilitate or restrict the use of one category over others. Koopmans et al. (2005, 142) find a "continued relevance of national integration politics" and substantial cross-national differences in the use of immigrant categories (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; see also: Koopmans and Muis 2009 ). These immigrant categories may be linked to citizenship policies or 'models of integration' (limitations of which are discussed for example in Joppke 2007; Bertossi 2011; compare Brubaker 1992) . Summarizing the extensive argument in Koopmans et al. (2005, 114-6) , Koopmans (2007a, 701-2) notes that the differences in the collective identities on which migrants mobilize "are largely independent of the composition of the immigrant populations, and rely instead on the dominant discourses on citizenship and immigrant integration, which emphasize national origin in Germany, race in Britain and delegitimize differentialist identities in France". Accordingly, the public expression of religious identities should be associated with the extent to which citizenship configurations allow for the expression of group rights ('cultural pluralism' rather than 'cultural monism') (Koopmans et al. 2005, 51-73, 115) . This is facilitated in the Netherlands, has some policy legitimacy in the United Kingdom, but is not recognized in Switzerland.
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Citizenship hypothesis: Religious identification is more common in countries with 'cultural pluralist' citizenship traditions, such as the Netherlands, than in countries with 'cultural monist' traditions, such as Switzerland. We therefore expect relatively more claims about Muslim immigrants in countries with cultural pluralist traditions than in countries with cultural monist traditions.
We focus on differences in policy traditions rather than the discursive structures mentioned above, because discursive structures are very difficult to disentangle from the actual categories of immigrant-groups (but see Cinalli and Giugni 2013) . This means that while conceptually different, the independent and dependent variable are in our view in that case empirically too closely connected to be differentiated in a meaningful manner. In addition, we focus on 'citizenship tradition' as a part of the generic opportunity structure rather than specify opportunities per actor-type such as immigrant organizations or anti-immigrant parties. We think that actor-specific opportunity structures are not immediately useful for the question at hand, given that there are also different opportunities within actor types. As a consequence, such distinctions are difficult to consider in the empirical analysis. 4 Koopmans et al. identify citizenship confgurations on the basis of 'equality of individual access' (civic vs. ethnic) and 'cultural differences and group rights' (monism vs. pluralism). The latter dimension includes rights associated with religious practices (religious educationɑ religious public televisionɑ right to wear headscarf etc.).
A second reason why immigrant categories differ can be found in enduring social trends and major events. For instance, Lipset et al. (1967) point to the industrialization of the economy and economic growth more generally as a prerequisite to political conflict between labour and capital. At the same time the likelihood of conflict between centre and periphery decreases (see also : Lipset 1960) . This argument can also be applied to immigrant groups, namely that the absence, presence or size of immigrant groups can be expected to influence whether they are politicized. Without immigrants there can hardly be political contestation of immigration issues and immigrant categories. All the countries included in this article are 'receiving countries', albeit at different rates and with very different immigration histories. The demographic composition of the immigrant population also varies significantly across the countries studied, notably also with regard to Muslim immigrants (Pew Research Center 2011, 121-4) . The different immigration histories and resulting composition of the immigrant population should produce distinct patterns in the occurrence of Muslim identities.
Population hypothesis:
The size of the Muslim immigrant population in a country can be expected to be positively associated with the proportion of claims about Muslim immigrants.
Our third hypothesis considers strategic considerations of political actors who seek expressions that are favourable to their political positions and arguments. There are at least three relevant strategic mechanisms available to them. First, political actors need the news media for 'validation' or 'standing' as recognized actors, as Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, 116) write: "receiving standing in the media is often a necessary condition before targets of influence will grant a movement recognition and deal with its claims and demands". This mainly applies to (new) social movements but probably also applies to (new) political parties, such as anti-immigrant parties. The validation of immigrant groups and anti-immigrant parties is a prerequisite for polarized politics on the issue -without actors, no politics. Second, political actors pursue a 'framing' strategy aimed at "structuring the world so you can win" (Riker 1996, 9) . Actors emphasize certain attributes of issues and de-emphasize others in such a way to gain maximum public support for their argument. Third, as noted by Schattschneider (1960, 2) , "the central political fact in a free society is the tremendous contagiousness of conflict". This implies that when some actors are in conflict -for instance anti-immigrant parties and pro-migrant groups -other actors will easily get involved, such as major government parties. These other actors are likely to use the pre-existing terms of the debate and may adopt positions close to potential 'winners' of the debate (van Spanje 2010).
The most important actors in this regard are political parties. We know that party strategies regarding the categorization of immigrant groups are shaped by the nature of party political mobilization and party political relationships within the party system (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; e.g. van der Brug, Hobolt, and de Vreese 2009). While several aspects of the party system play a role -including its dimensionality and polarization -, the electoral success of issue owners, in this case anti-immigration parties, seems to be a critical factor. Their presence in national legislatures should make it more likely that immigration is politicized in general , and more likely that Muslims immigrants are considered a distinct category within the immigrant population.
Anti-immigration party hypothesis:
The electoral success of anti-immigration parties can be expected to be positively related to the proportion of claims about Muslim immigrants.
Major political and non-political events, abroad and in the country, can affect the ways in which immigrant groups are referred to in public debates (e.g. Olesen 2007) . In policy studies this would be referred to as events that trigger 'punctuated' political change (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Walgrave and Varone 2008; Birkland 1997) . This is especially the case for events with great resonance in public and political debate. A corollary is that violent Muslim extremism in New York in 2001 and later in Madrid and London provided a trigger for political actors to differentiate among immigrants, and to specifically focus on Muslims as a subgroup of immigrants. This can mean a punctuation of policies or new wave of politics on integration issues. In all countries under consideration, we should therefore find fewer references to Muslim immigrants before 2001 than after . We argue that these potential explanations are mediated by the context of specific political debates, which limit the immigrant categories that can plausibly be used. For instance, it makes little sense to talk about illegal migrants in the context of political debates on civic integration policies, because illegal migrants are usually excluded from such policies. The first mediating factor relates to the topic at hand. We expect more frequent use of status categories on migration topics, and more frequent use of religious categories in claims about civic integration. The arguments also matter: For similar reasons we expect that the arguments used to justify the position of the political actors are related to immigration classifications (e.g. Helbling 2014b).
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When political actors provide instrumental, pragmatic, and usually policy-related arguments, we expect them to refer to policy status categories. In cases where political actors justify their position with reference to their own or others' identity or culture, they are likely to use religious or ethnic migrant categories. This resembles the typology used by Cinalli and O'Flynn (2014) where they differentiate types of arguments, such as the more inwardly-directed identity arguments and arguments that acknowledge the other like appeals to the common good. We also include the type of claimsmaker as a mediating factor. We expect government actors to use administrative categories more often, whereas political parties and other actors probably use more society-oriented 5 Similar to Hoglinger et al. (2012, 237-43) , we derive the classification of arguments into instrumental, identity and principled arguments from Habermas' (1993) differentiation of justifications. This three-fold distinction has been used by several researchers (e.g. Lerch and Schwellnus 2006; Sjursen 2002, 494 fn492, 495) . Instrumental frames present positions as a "rational choice of means in the light of fixed purposes or of the rational assessment of goals in the light of existing preferences" (Habermas, 1993, p. 3) . A political position is justified as a calculation of utility and may refer to management techniques, economic effects, or policy programmes. Identity frames refer to 'the self-understanding of a person' (Habermas, 1993, p. 5) . They have a strong historical and cultural component and may refer to duties, cultural differences, norms and a particular conception of the collective 'us'. Political actors can also invoke universal principles of justice such as equality, solidarity, fairness, or the (universal) moral obligation to protect people in need.
categories, such as those associated with religion, country of origin or race/ethnicity. While these are rather broad categories, we do not have an a priori reason to expect other specific types of actors to use certain classifications. We acknowledge that the three outlined mediating factors associated with the direct political context merit fundamental theoretical grounding including in depth specification of causal mechanisms. Such an extensive theoretical exercise is beyond the scope of this article; in the conclusion we highlight this as an area for future research. Figure 1 summarizes the expected relationship between these factors.
[ Figure 1 around here]
Data and Methodology
We use a large-scale claims analysis of newspapers in seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) between 1995 and 2009. This is a period when immigrant numbers -including Muslim immigrants -increased substantially in some of the countries covered, particularly Spain and Ireland. As a result the data include sufficient variance to study the dynamics of claims-making, and are likely to allow inferences beyond the time covered. These countries have varying proportions of Muslim immigrants, distinct citizenship traditions, and differ in the electoral success of antiimmigrant parties. The countries thus provide variance in the explanatory variables outlined in the preceding section. For instance, the share of Muslims in the population is relatively low in Ireland and Spain, while their share in Austria and the Netherlands is relatively high. With presence in all countries, the potential for politicizing Muslims is given -especially at times when immigration and integration are high on the political agenda (see van der Brug et al. 2015 for detailed country descriptions and patterns of politicization). The selection of the time period makes it possible to compare patterns of claims-making before and after 2001.
Our approach to data collection is similar to other political claims analysis projects such as MERCI (Koopmans et al. 2005) , EURISLAM (UNIGE 2010), LOCALMULTIDEM (Cinalli and Giugni 2007; Cinalli and Giugni 2009) and EUROPUB (Koopmans and Statham 2010) . Similar to these projects, we refer to political claims-making as the "the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors" (Koopmans et al. 2005, 254) . Political actors continuously make claims. These could be observed for example in police records, press statements or parliamentary debates. Practically all studies, however, rely on newspapers to document claims by various types of political actors (e.g. Beyeler and Kriesi 2005; Koopmans 2007a; Koopmans 2007b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012) . Earlier studies point out that selection bias is a relatively limited problem (Earl et al. 2004; Mügge 2012) . We include claims irrespective of their form or actor who makes them, but in the analysis focus on claims where an object actor is specified.
We use a sample of newspaper articles from both quality and tabloid newspapers, 6 drawn using the same random sample of 700 days in each of the countries studied, yielding 7,029 claims. The articles were selected by browsing through the physical newspapers and the coding procedure was centralized (coders from different countries were trained collectively and could coordinate their coding decisions among themselves). The number of claims per country ranges from 614 in Ireland to 1,319 in the Netherlands, with a mean of 1,004 claims (see Berkhout 2012 for a discussion of inter-coder reliability).
As is common in claims analysis, we make a distinction between the subject actor (i.e. the claims-maker), 7 the object actor, the topic of the claim, as well as the frame used to justify the claims. The subject actor is the organization or its representative making a claim about immigration and integration. The object actor describes the group potentially affected were the claim to become reality. This group can be a specific immigrant group or any other specific section of the population (but can remain unspecified as in claims assumed to affect 'the public' in general). The subject actor may relate to the object actor in a positive or negative way.
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If a claim is classified as being about a religious group, this means that were the particular claim to become reality, a sub-group based on religion would be affected. Of course members of groups identified by religion also have a particular legal or administrative status, but the claims-maker in this instance chose to highlight religion. Put differently, the claims in the news are used as evidence of how immigrant groups are constituted, because in each instance a claims-maker speaks of Muslim immigrants, he or she could also have referred to them in terms of country of origin (e.g. Turkey), residence permit (e.g. a person with a short-term permit), being a foreign citizen, or indeed in a way that does not identify the person as an immigrant (e.g. a young mother). It is in this sense that we can talk about immigrant and minority groups being politically constructed, with claims-making reflecting active choices.
We focus on claims about immigration and integration in a relative broad sense. This includes government activities about the entry and exit of people from the country, the general policy direction, issues of border control, and actions related to illegal entry. We also cover social, cultural and economic conflicts, as well as issues related to social cohesion if they involve immigrants. In this context we cover policies on targeted integration, language and citizenship programmes, and issues on how immigration affects existing policy. Activities, problems, and social contributions of immigrant communities are included. We do not distinguish between different Muslim organizations, and treat them as a single category. We have no specific expectations on different kinds of Muslim organizations, and do not assume that many political actors or the general public make clear distinctions between different Muslim organizations.
Findings
Claims-making about immigration and integration is dominated by government and party actors (van der Brug et al. 2015) . As can be seen in Table 1 , government actors tend to make most claims about immigration and integration, and they tend to make claims that are positive about Muslim immigrants. By contrast, political parties tend to make more negative claims about Muslim immigrants. In the United Kingdom and Ireland journalists are more common as claims-makers than in the other countries. Non-governmental organizations and other civil-society organizations are also important claims-makers in all countries covered. With just 1 per cent of claims in the news, anti-immigrant actors play only a marginal role in claims that appear in newspapers. Similarly, with 2 per cent of claims, Muslim organizations are not among the major claims-makers on immigration and integration, not even in claims where Muslim immigrants are affected -in which case 16 per cent of claims are made by Muslim organizations.
[ Table 1 around here]
We begin with a description of immigrant categorization by country and over time, showing how the claims-makers presented in Table 1 jointly refer to different immigrant groups. This provides the context for the analysis in the subsequent section on how Muslim immigrants appear in claims. Table 2 gives the percentage of claims by object actor; the first column in the table gives the distribution of claims about the different groups for all seven countries jointly. Claims by all actor types are combined, and most claims are made about administrative status groups (first four rows of the table). Claims referring to religion, race/ethnicity, or country of origin are far less common. Highlighted in grey is the use of religious categories, the variation of which we treat in the subsequent section. To some extent the numbers in Table 2 are in line with the specificities of the migration profile of the countries under study. While the use of administrative categories is dominant in all countries, it is the relative attention to the administrative subcategories that seems related to immigration patterns. We find, for instance, large proportions of claims about 'illegal migrants' in Spain and about 'labour migrants' in Ireland. The same numbers also indicate some support for the idea that citizenship traditions affect immigrant identities. We find, for instance, a high proportion of race/ethnicity classifications in the United Kingdom. The relatively low percentages for religion indicate that for non-Muslim immigrants, religion tends not to be a salient characteristic used by claims-makers. Indeed there are only very few claims with reference to other religions present in our sample of claims (N=17).
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In the statistical models, we consider changes in the strength of anti-immigrant parties and changes in the Muslim immigrant population to match changes in claims-making. Anti-immigrant parties were identified on the basis of their party manifestos, and the Muslim population taken from censuses and large-scale representative surveys. We acknowledge that the size of the Muslim population in Europe is sometimes difficult to assess, but have used the same instructions across all countries, and the approaches are certainly consistent over time within each country.
[ Table 2 around here] Figure 2 shows how the use of Muslim immigrants as object actor in claims-making has changed, showing three periods of 5 years. With the exception of Spain and Ireland, we see the proportion of claims about religious groups increase over the years. For example, between 1995 and 1999, just 1.5 per cent of claims in Austria concerned religious groups. Between 2005 and 2009, this proportion has increased to 13.1 per cent of claims: a nine time increase. Britain differs from the other countries in that ethnic and racial categories are also used regularly, especially in the first period covered here. Initially, between 2000 and 2004, we observe a marked increase of administrative status categories in Britain, and more recently, an increasing importance of claims about religious groups. In the third period, there were more claims about religious groups than about ethnic and racial groups, indicating that the developments in Britain increasingly resemble those of the other countries under study.
The changes over time in Figure 2 highlight a dynamic nature not apparent in any country typology. The rise of Muslim immigrants as a category of immigrants is not in line with the categories that are commonly associated with different traditions of citizenship policies. The figures suggest that there is indeed merit in assessing the influence of the factors discussed in the theoretical section.
[ Figure 2 around here] Figure 3 shows the proportion of claims with Muslim immigrants as object actor by the factors mentioned in the conceptual model in Figure 1 . The mediating factors are shown in the upper half of the figure. These are variables that are associated with the immediate context of the political debate. The bars in the lower half refer to country and time differences. There is substantial variation in all factors of interest, generally confirming the expectations outlined above.
To start with the mediating factors, government and parliamentary actors are less likely to make claims about Muslim immigrants than other actors. We generally record only very few claims by anti-immigrant parties (see Table 1 ), and do not report them separately so as not to misinterpret small numbers. Of all government claims, around five per cent have Muslim immigrants as object actors, compared to nine per cent for other actors. This is a significant difference in the propensity to make claims about Muslim immigrants as can be seen by the confidence intervals which do not overlap. It confirms that government actors are more likely to use administrative categories than other actors.
When actors use arguments of collective identity, in 19 per cent of the cases they refer to Muslim immigrants. This is far more than when claims are justified with other arguments and strongly supports that a political justification referring to identity also leads to group classifications based on cultural identity, in this case Muslim. In claims made about immigration -as opposed to integration -, we find that far fewer claims are made about Muslim immigrants. Recall that we include a broad range of topics, notably integration in addition to immigration. The results indicate that studies of 'new' political conflicts in Western Europe need to use a broad range of topics under migration issues or risk serious under-specification of the causes and effects of such new conflict dimensions. As also visible in Table 2 , there are substantial differences between countries in the use of Muslim immigrants as a political category in political claims. As also visible in Figure 2 , the lowest two bars in Figure 3 show that there is a substantial increase in the claims about Muslim immigrants after 2001. The strong variation in the variables related to the immediate context of the political debate (actors, arguments, topics) indicates that country-differences such as citizenship configurations, only partially explain the types of migrant categories used.
[ Figure 3 around here]
In Table 3 , we present five logit regression models in order to assess the effect of all variables simultaneously rather than rely on the bivariate associations in Figure 3 . The dependent variable is the use of Muslim immigrants as object actor in political claims. Models 1 to 3 include factors related to the immediate political debate. In model 4 and 5, we add contextual country and time level variation. With data on only seven countries, we have insufficient statistical leverage to assess country-level variables. We therefore capture country-level variation through country dummy variables and, further below, comparatively assess whether the country-differences observed in these models are associated with the country characteristics hypothesized to cause these differences (namely the population of Muslim immigrants and the seat share of anti-immigrant parties). This approach is more adequate than cross-tabulating country proportions of claims about Muslim immigrants because it allows us to account for variation caused by other explanatory variables, most notably those associated with actors, topics and arguments used.
Model 1 shows that, compared to the reference category government actors, other organized actors are more likely to refer to Muslim immigrants. While statistically significant, substantially this is only a small effect: The type of actor explains only a very small part of the variation (R 2 = 0.01). In model 2, we add the types of arguments used. This increases the explanatory power to 0.06. As mentioned earlier, the use of identity arguments increases the likelihood that actors make claims about Muslim immigrants. This is a substantial effect and clearly shows that 'argumentation' is a central instrument for political actors. Following Cinalli and O'Flynn (2014) , this can be interpreted as inwardly-oriented arguments being important in the case of Muslim immigrants, but our analysis does not allow for a more indepth exploration of this view. Studies like theirs are necessary to differentiate between different claims in terms of quality and impact -something the data at hand do not allow. In model 3, we additionally account for the topic discussed. If the topic of a claim is civic integration it is far more likely that Muslim immigrants are referred to than when immigration issues are debated. The intermediate variables derived from the properties of the claim itself explain jointly about 19 per cent of the variation in the propensity to make claims about Muslim immigrants.
Model 4 also includes country dummies, and the difference in the country coefficients is broadly consistent with Figure 3 . Austria is an exception: In Figure 3 , Austria ranks below Belgium in the use of claims about Muslim immigrants, whereas in model 4 it ranks above Belgium. This suggests that the differences between countries in Figure 3 are partly caused by the nature of the debate (actors, arguments and topics); after controlling for these factors, country differences become more pronounced. In model 5, we include a dummy variable to test for a 9/11 effect. Looking at the R-squared, this marginally improves the explanatory power of the model, but the topic of a claim and the country provide the largest contribution to explaining the use of claims about Muslim immigrants.
Why do we find that in some countries -especially Switzerland and Austria -claims are more likely to be about Muslim immigrants than in other countries? Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the coefficients of model 5 as bar charts, ranked by the proportion of Muslim immigrants in the population and by the seat share of anti-immigrant parties respectively. 10 We have selected Ireland as the reference category because, with a relatively small Muslim community and no anti-immigrant party, interpretation is made simpler. We do not find substantial differences when running the regression with different reference categories. Figure 4 suggests that in countries with comparatively large share of Muslim immigrants, such as the Netherlands and Austria, we do not find more frequent references to Muslim immigrants than in countries with comparatively small shares, such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Especially the Swiss case indicates the weakness of the hypothesis that the number of Muslim immigrants should lead to frequent claims about Muslim immigrants. Despite the relatively small share of Muslim immigrants we find that claims in Switzerland are more likely to refer to Muslim immigrants than claims in other countries. Indeed, over time the Muslim population in Switzerland has remained relatively stable, but claims about Muslim immigrants have increased significantly. By contrast, Figure 5 shows that in countries with substantial anti-immigrant parties in parliament there are strong country effects for the use of claims about Muslim immigrants. With the exception of the United Kingdom, the rank order of the coefficients is the same as that of the seat share of antiimmigrant parties. This strong and consistent effect is in line with the literature on strategies of political parties. It seems that the presence of an anti-immigrant party 'validates' the category of Muslim immigrants, though anti-immigrant parties are not prominent claimmakers themselves.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we examined what kind immigration-related categories are used in political debates about immigration and civic integration. More specifically, we are interested in the circumstances under which a religion-based immigrant categorization occurs, using claimsmaking as evidence for such categorization. We focus on Muslim immigrants since international terrorism and anti-Islamic political mobilization make them the most likely case for differences in categorization associated with new conflict dimensions. This provides us with leverage to assess potential explanations for country differences in the political use of immigration-related categories. Based on theories from distinct research traditions, we expected these differences to depend on three factors: on citizenship policies, on the sociostructural composition (the proportion of Muslim immigrants in the population), and on political strategies of political parties -particularly anti-immigration parties. Country differences are inherently difficult to assess, because there are few countries compared to the number of factors potentially affecting the outcomes (in our case seven countries and three factors). We partially addressed this by looking at changes over time (to assess 'event' effects), and by examining the immediate context of the political debate (actors, topic and arguments). This nevertheless means that we cannot formally test the influence of all country differences. Especially regarding the citizenship typology we have to rely on a comparative interpretation of our descriptive findings.
With regard to citizenship traditions, claims-makers in all countries mostly relate to very broad, administrative, status-related categories such as immigrants or asylum-seekers. They differ in the use of the smaller racial/ethnic, religious and country-of-origin categories. Although we find significant differences across countries, these differences are only partially associated with commonly used citizenship typologies. For instance, Muslim categories are relatively common in the moderately cultural pluralist United Kingdom and the culturally monist Switzerland, whereas the limited recognition of group rights in these countries led us to expect prominent use of racial and country-of-origin categories respectively. The weak connection between citizenship regime and immigrant categorisation may be related to the increase of claims about Muslim immigrants after 2001, which is more recent than the longterm data commonly used for classifying citizenship configurations. In our view, however, this weak connection is probably due to another two phenomena. First, any country typology is relatively static by nature. This article demonstrates that there are substantial changes over time in that the use of religious categories has increased in all countries under study -except in Spain and Ireland. This suggests that the use of immigrant categories in the public sphere is more dynamic than can be captured in country types that change only very slowly. The observation of similar trends in different countries -the increase of the religious categoryalso suggests that the countries are more similar than any typology would present them. Second, our 'citizenship policy' hypothesis assumes a strong relationship between the policy arena and the political arena. This seems to be true for the administrative immigration categories identified. But for the religious category examined in this article we do not find that the (non-)recognition by administrative groups spills over into political debate (or the other way around). In other words, while we have no grounds to challenge any typology of immigration and integration policy, we do not find that it is strongly related to political contestation on these issues. Policy and political arenas seem to operate in relative isolation.
Turning to socio-structural factors, we only find partial confirmation of the expectation that the presence of a substantial Muslim minority translates into the political use of Muslim immigrants. Based on Figure 4 , our impression is that this works as a threshold effect: In countries with under around one per cent of Muslims, such as in Ireland and Spain, Muslim immigrants are hardly ever the object of claims; in countries with more substantial minorities (more than around one per cent), such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Muslim immigrants are common objects of political claims. Studies on sub-national units may be useful to examine this proposition further. However, the variation in claims about Muslim immigrants in the countries with a substantial Muslim minority is unrelated to the actual size or growth of the Muslim minority over time. This suggests that theories emphasizing the social base of politics provide conditional explanations. A social base is a necessary but not sufficient explanation for, in this case, immigrant categorization.
In countries where anti-immigrant parties have substantial parliamentary presence, Muslim immigrants are more frequently the objects of political claims. This is what can be expected on the basis of the literature on party political strategies (e.g. van Spanje 2010), and suggests that immigrant classification is predominantly an actor-driven phenomenon conditional on the party system. More to the point, anti-immigrant parties seem to drive Muslim categorization when they are formally and informally able to participate in electoral competition. It seems that the presence of an anti-immigrant party with 'standing' in the news media successfully 'frames' migration in identity terms and produces a 'contagion' of other actors in the use of Muslim immigrants as objects in claims-making. The contagiousness of conflict affects non-anti-immigrant political parties and actors, in the sense that these actors also make more claims that potentially affect Muslim immigrants. With the small numbers of claims recorded for anti-immigrant parties in the data available, we cannot provide a formal test for the interaction between anti-immigrant and other actors. In more general terms, various strategic and actor-related factors, seem to promote (or restrict) the political translation of social differences. If we assume, as Kriesi et al. (2012) do, that anti-immigrant parties are a political manifestation of the 'new cultural cleavage' between so-called winners and losers of globalization, then this new social cleavage -while perhaps uniting 'losers' -divides Muslim immigrants from other immigrant groups.
The analysis of the immediate political context of claims-making suggests that this could be a more fruitful level for theory formation than the country level discussed earlier. At the level of topic fields, we found an exceptionally clear difference between immigration and integration as topics on the one hand, and the categorization of Muslim immigrants as a distinct group on the other hand. There is also a strong correlation between the use of identity frames and references to Muslim immigrants. Our results thus suggest that, in theoretical terms, macro-level factors, such a socio-structural and political institutional variables are only part of the story, and need be combined with lower level variables such as those associated with the arguments used (e.g. Cinalli and O'Flynn 2014) : at the actor level, but also at the level of topic domains. Such a combination would take into account the emergence and decline of issues on the policy agenda of countries; it seems that the agenda determines politics. In future research, it is thus important to carefully incorporate expectations about topic-level variation in political behaviour. At the minimum one should try to incorporate variation in the topic selected for research. Here we differentiated between immigration and integration (and sub-topics). Although a broad specification, it still leaves out some topics in which Muslim immigrants potentially appear as a social category. We do not think this affects our results, because immigration and integration are the most likely topics on which Muslim immigrants are objects of claims. For future studies on the categorization of certain sub-groups in society, however, a sufficiently broad range of policy topics should be included and theoretically accounted for.
Our analysis of the use of Muslims as an immigrant category has shown that the political debate is more volatile, and thus probably more responsive to immediate concerns, than suggested by the sole analysis of changes of policies and policy traditions. It seems that for Muslim immigrants in Europe, becoming a distinct social category is, to say the least, probably a mixed blessing. On the one hand, with becoming a distinct social category comes an increased likelihood of recognition. This can mean increased autonomy in aspects important to the group. On the other hand, this distinct social category is predominantly shaped by actors other than Muslims, meaning that the boundaries and meaning of being Muslim are to a large extent outside the control of Muslims. (-0.045) , in the United Kingdom relatively negative (-0.500) . By contrast, the legislative and parties in the United Kingdom are relatively positive (0.250). 
Figure 2: Proportion of Claims about Muslim Immigrants by Country and Over Time
Notes: excludes claims with no recorded object actor, periods of five years are averaged (1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
